russian yout culture

Russia’s Youth: Myths and Reality

Exposing Stereotypes By Asking Questions

Over the past two years, both the public and the state have focused intensely on the condition of Russia’s youth. To a certain degree, the youth have become another “priority national project,” and only the laziest of political parties doesn’t try to exploit the energy of the young for “revolutionary” or “counterrevolutionary” purposes. The new generation is at the center of every discussion of every topic in Russian public life: the victorious march of mass culture and degradation of family values; conscription; the crisis of Russian science; patriotic education; and the lack of vertical mobility into the country’s elite.
Most of the discussions involve preconceived ideas about young people, and these myths end up being reflected in what could be called “youth policy.” Surveys reveal that people over 35 view the younger generation as aggressive, cynical, unwilling to adhere to traditional morality, obsessed with money, lost in the virtual reality of pop culture, completely divorced from their roots, exhibiting social apathy, having little or no interest in politics, and over half of those surveyed speak of an unbridgeable generation gap.
These opinions barely coincide with way the young see themselves. According to data from VTsIOM (the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research), they view this aggressiveness simply as self-confidence and initiative, while the noted obsession with information technologies merely reflects a high level of education. The idols of the young are rock stars, the “golden youth” the privileged children of the rich (52 percent), successful businessmen and oligarchs (39 percent) and sports stars (27 percent). This is not unusual for a developed country it is clear that all three groups are walking success stories and, hence, are attractive for those at the beginning of their adult lives. By the way, it is noteworthy that the skeptical attitude to politicians as idols (4 percent) does not cover Vladimir Putin (11 percent), whose experience of vertical mobility is quite appealing to those from modest backgrounds.
The major values of modern youth are different from what the older generations suspect. First of all, during the years of reform, their expectations were transformed substantially. For the overwhelming majority, the focus of their lives is achieving financial wellbeing and having a family the same focus as in other age groups. For people in the 18-to-24-year-old group, the key goals in life are wealth (62 percent), a successful career (37 percent) and a good education (21 percent). In the second echelon come a good family (56 percent) and healthy, well-behaved children (45 percent). People a bit older (25 to 34 years old) display even greater uniformity in their responses. For them, wealth, family and children all fall within a basic range of importance (58 percent). In opposition to the majority of the population, however, young people are proud of having billionaires in Russia and would like to take their place (27 percent) or, alternatively, to have their children show up on the Forbes list of the most wealthy (47 percent).
Hence, today’s younger generation, which grew up under the conditions of tough economic reforms, is much more mercantile and pragmatic. Money and career opportunities remain the primary stimuli for their activities. At the same time, this newer generation is continuing the trend toward the atomization of society their concentration on family and a close circle of friends and relatives is even higher than the older group, while their self-reliance moves them further away from collective activities and the public good. This approach is widespread among 25-to-34-year-old respondents, many of whom have their own families and seek stability as much as pensioners.
Young people are also proactive. They have a totally different view of the role of state in the economy and the social sphere in comparison with other age groups. It is clear that the new generation is drifting more toward a traditional liberal world and away from traditions of paternalism. Thirty-seven to 42 percent of respondents in this age group say that they can do without help from the state, which they believe should focus instead on providing basic equal opportunities for all.
In order to achieve success, many 18-to-24-year-old respondents are ready to jettison existing moral principles that officially upheld by the older generation (62 percent). This view is shared by only 50 percent of those from the older group (25-to-34-year olds), who belong partly to a Soviet code of morality.
Therefore, the younger generation is one made up of optimistic realists trying to find a balance between universal liberty (in income and morality) and conservatism for all (with regard to family values).
As could be expected, the young appear to be more tolerant, with fewer respondents condemning smoking, drugs and alcoholism, homosexuality, corruption, or even hypocrisy and indifference, than in older groups.
All of these results provide insight into social patterns associated with Russian youth. Young people show only a slightly higher level of political apathy compared to other age groups. For instance, 55 percent of young respondents say that they have not taken part in any form of public or social action in the last two or three years, as against 47 percent for Russians as a whole. Sixty-two percent say they have no interest in politics, compared with 50 percent for the general population. About 20 percent say that they simply don’t have the time, and a mere 37 percent say that they discuss political matters in conversation. The most common political activity is voting, although young people vote in numbers 5 to 10 percent lower than for the population at large.
In general, young respondents prefer non-politicized, informal mechanisms and associations when it comes to leisure activities, professional cooperation or other forms of self-expression. This accounts for the increasing popularity of flash mobs, which represent a powerful mobilization tool, as well as for growing interest in various historical and literary societies such as fans of the Lord of the Rings series or Harry Potter. Religion is not a strong underpinning for social activities, but the majority of young respondents view religion as a national tradition and form of connection with their ancestors (38 to 42 percent) or as a part of world culture and history (26 to 27 percent). Many young Russians actually demonstrate almost Protestant attitudes when discussing religion by emphasizing aspects such as personal salvation and communication with God (17 to 24 percent) or morality (19 to 22 percent), instead of the emphasis on the popular understanding of Orthodox Christianity like participation in church life and the observance of religious customs (7 to 10 percent).
As for their place on the political spectrum, this newer generation is located somewhat to the right of center. For example, 42 to 45 percent of young respondents say that they are happy with the way democracy works in Russia and believe that the state should focus on the maintenance of freedoms and observing human rights. Twenty-two to 27 percent say that they or their families have ultimately gained from the reforms of the past 15 years and a majority 52 to 53 percent say that they would not sacrifice freedom of speech and democratic elections to the cause of Russia’s return to greatness. Twenty-four to 25 percent of respondents in this age group favor the free market and political democracy, while 21 to 28 percent stress the importance of social justice.
Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate the liberal leanings among Russian youth. Like the population at large, they are not looking for a democratic “revolution,” since they see no threats to democracy in the country and don’t place much stake in the concept of a universal democratic model. As a result, the number of those who favor radical reforms is about even with those who favor stability and an evolutionary approach. This explains the support among 40 to 45 percent of today’s youth for United Russia and other bodies associated with the current government and presidential administration.
Only about 10 percent of young people have heard of any youth political organizations and from 68 to 78 percent of those surveyed say that they do not take part in the activities of any groups of this type. Among the groups that have developed some sort of profile among the young are Nashi (18 percent), the National Bolsheviks (16 percent), and skinheads or other nationalist-patriotic movements (12 percent). It is clear that groups with direct connections to parties are less popular than non-party brands like Nashi and Walking Together. Part of the reason is that these two structures are perceived as offering help up the career ladder through involvement with actual groups in power and social networking, and do not suffer from the discredited image of their parent parties as do the Yabloko or Rodina youth organizations.
But the alleged apathy of youth which is really no greater than that of their parents does not have a negative affect on their patriotism, if patriotism is defined as values such as love and care for the family, a focus on raising children well and a willingness to sacrifice personal well-being for their sake.
One idea often linked with patriotism is that of Russia as a great power, and 52 to 55 percent of young people identify it as a concept capable of uniting the entire nation. Opinion differs, however, when it comes to defining the nature of this “greatness.” While half of those within this age group identify Russia’s history and traditional way of life as the basis for “spirituality” in the country, the other half are more skeptical and prefer power based on economic strength and the security and well- being of its citizens.
It is important not to exaggerate the degree of extreme nationalism and xenophobia among Russian youth. For most of those involved in this type of organization or behavior, they are attractive as surrogates for the lack of interesting social activities or romanticism in their everyday lives. A mere 1 to 2 percent sympathize with the skinheads or National Bolsheviks and 9 percent agree with proclamations such as “Russia for Russians,” but these ideas hold little interest for the vast majority of Russian youth.
Thus, despite all of the transformations of the last 15 years, the attitudes of Russian youth of today demonstrates a substantial degree of continuity with those of previous generations. Obviously, young people are more individualistic, more able to adapt to change, more pragmatic and more focused on achieving personal success. But their love for family, their desire that Russia be respected in the world, their notions of nationalism or any kind of social/political action are similar to those of their parents. After all, it’s in their blood as Russians.